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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ADDIS ABABA 001779

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TAGS: PREL KPKO AU UN SU SO ET

SUBJECT: A/S FRAZER TALKS SUDAN AND SOMALIA WITH AU
COMMISSIONER DJINNIT

Classified By: A/S JENDAYI FRAZER FOR REASONS 1.4. (B) AND (D)

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: AU Peace and Security Commissioner Said Djinnit called Sudan's recent refusal to accept a UN Mission in Darfur a "big problem," but ultimately agreed with A/S Frazer that the GOS was simply delaying the inevitable UN deployment as long as possible. Frazer and Djinnit agreed that another effort should be made to bring SLM leader Abdulwahid into the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), perhaps through a greater contribution to the compensation fund negotiated through the SPLM. Djinnit told A/S Frazer that it would be easier for the AU and Sudan to accept international assistance in establishing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for Darfur if the help came in the form of a direct offer from the U.S. and Canada, rather than from NATO. Regarding Somalia, Djinnit emphasized the nervousness within IGAD countries about the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), and said that Ethiopia would likely act unilaterally if the AU and international community failed to back rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force. Djinnit expected that an initial IGAD force would eventually be replaced by an AU mission once the latter could be organized. He welcomed the peace deal brokered between the UIC and Somali Transitional Federal Government (TFG) on June 22 by the Arab League, which he said was "based on principles." He wondered whether the UIC was prepared to publicly reject terrorism, however. The best way to address the terrorist threat in Somalia, he added, was through effective government authorities in the country. A/S Frazer told Djinnit that the recent international Somalia Contact Group had expressed strong support for the TFG and had decided to include IGAD and the Arab League in future meetings. She also indicated that the USG, along with other UNSC members, were considering the AU request to lift partially the arms embargo on Somalia to facilitate a peace support mission. Djinnit invited U.S. participation in the June 28-29 AU/IGAD meeting in Nairobi, and Frazer accepted.
END SUMMARY.

¶2. (SBU) A/S Frazer called on AU Peace and Security Commissioner Djinnit June 23, accompanied by CJTF-HOA Commander RADM Hunt, Pol/Econ Counselor, AF/E Somalia deskoff Nole Garey and HOA MilAid Mike Sowa. AU Peace and Security Director Geoffrey Mugumya joined Djinnit.

NATO ASSISTANCE IN DARFUR; STILL SENSITIVE; BILATERAL HELP
EASIER

¶3. (C) A/S Frazer thanked Djinnit for the recent AU letter requesting assistance from NATO in support of AMIS. This would allow NATO to provide help including 1) training/mentoring teams of 3 to 4 officers in each sector to provide training in-theatre, on the ground; 2) staff for a Joint Operations Center; and 3) a Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

in each sector that would use existing helicopters to improve monitoring, reaction and DPA verification. Frazer noted that this assistance would fit within AMIS's updated concept of operations (CONOPS), which called for shifting from an observation mission to a more robust peacekeeping profile. Djinnit replied by underscoring continuing sensitivities about NATO troops on the ground in Sudan. Frazer made the case that several African states, including troop contributing countries like Nigeria, Rwanda and Senegal had asked for more NATO assistance to strengthen AMIS' capacity. These countries had suggested that the AU Commission was in fact the stumbling block. Djinnit rejected the claims and challenged those countries to make the same statements in AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) meetings that they made to U.S. officials in private. He told Frazer that there had been "no decision in the PSC yet to deploying NATO troops." The A/S replied that the USG interpreted "international organization" language in the recent PSC resolution on AMIS to cover NATO. Djinnit told A/S Frazer that it would be easier for the AU and Sudan to accept international assistance in establishing a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) for Darfur if the help came in the form of a direct offer from the U.S. and Canada, rather than from NATO. He agreed, however, that beginning work on an broad MOU between NATO and the AU would be a positive step. A/S Frazer accepted this two-track approach.

FRAZER: TEST SUDAN THROUGH VISA PROCESS

¶4. (C) The A/S expressed concern both about the recent rejection of the planned transition from AMIS to a UN mission by Sudanese President Al-Bashir, as well as about recent projections from UN SRSG Guehenno that the transition could

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only be finalized in January 2007. Djinnit replied that the UN could be prevailed upon to speed up the transition if preparations on the ground moved forward fast enough. He called Sudan's recent refusal to accept a UN Mission in Darfur a "big problem," but ultimately agreed with A/S Frazer that the GOS was simply delaying the inevitable UN deployment as long as possible. He also reiterated his request that permission for deployment of US and NATO personnel be wrapped in a larger package of support presented by a broad range of partners. This would make it easier for the AU and Sudanese Government to digest. A/S Frazer pressed Djinnit to test Sudanese cooperation with AMIS assistance through the visa process piecemeal, rather than waiting for the ideal scenario negotiated as a whole. The AU Commissioner agreed, although he urged that partner visa requests for AMIS be made through the AU, rather than bilaterally. Djinnit called for immediately integrating as many UN personnel as possible into AMIS; technical discussions would be needed to flesh out how this would take place. Frazer and Djinnit agreed to let the existing Darfur Integrated Task Force (DITF) process resolve how to deploy the minimum number of NATO and US personnel for maximum impact.

EXTRA EFFORT TO BRING SLM'S ABDULWAHID ON BOARD

¶5. (C) Djinnit offered A/S Frazer a brief readout on his trip to Sudan with the Joint UN/AU assessment mission. The PSC Commissioner indicated that the DPA had not improved security in all areas. Fighting between rebel movements continued. The GOS believed things were improving, however. Djinnit noted that many in Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) camps were against the DPA because of continuing security concerns and dissatisfaction with the terms of compensation. Frazer replied that Abdulwahid of the SLM continued to argue for a \$100-150 million compensation fund, as well as to be part of the security arrangements for people returning home. She added that Abdulwahid was critical to the success of the DPA,

so it was important to find a face-saving way for him to get on board. The A/S suggested moving an extra \$70 million from the current fund for reconstruction and back-filling the reconstruction fund with additional international contributions. Djinnit agreed, but wondered whether Abdulwahid, who was inherently unstable, would settle in the end for anything less than a vice-presidency. Frazer said that the SLM leader had of late consistently focused on the issue of compensation. Djinnit argued that the SPLM and its leader, Salva Kiir, were well positioned to negotiate such a deal with Abdulwahid. Frazer agreed that it would be better if the U.S. did not take charge of the effort. The PSC Commissioner added that "everyone here objects to labeling DPA hold-outs as terrorists."

SOMALIA: STEPS TOWARD PEACE SUPPORT MISSION

¶6. (C) Djinnit said the AU had been disappointed with the international community's weak support for the TFG so far, but recent developments gave everyone a golden opportunity to revisit the issue. Djinnit emphasized the nervousness within IGAD countries about the UIC, and said that Ethiopia would likely act unilaterally if the AU and international community failed to back rapid deployment of a peacekeeping force. Djinnit expected that an initial IGAD force would eventually be replaced by an AU mission once the latter could be organized. He welcomed the peace deal brokered between the UIC and TFG on June 22 by the Arab League, which he said was "based on principles." He wondered whether the UIC was prepared to publicly reject terrorism, however. The best way to address the terrorist threat in Somalia, he added, was through effective government authorities in the country. Djinnit invited U.S. participation in the June 28-29 AU/IGAD meeting in Nairobi, and Frazer accepted. It was critical that AU, IGAD and partners be realistic in planning such a Somalia mission, Djinnit said.

¶7. (C) A/S Frazer told Djinnit that she had heard the region's message on stronger support for the TFG. She noted that she had met with a number of TFG leaders in Nairobi, that the recently-formed International Somalia Contact Group had convened in large part to galvanize international support for the TFG. Frazer said that Contact Group (CG) members were also concerned about the UIC, but wanted to encourage moderate members of the UIC. She explained the process of selecting CG participants and indicated that the group had decided at its recent meeting to invite both IGAD and the Arab League to participate at the next session. The CG did not want to bring either the TFG nor front-line states into the group, which was in any case simply a mechanism for

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sharing information and coordinating policy, not an executive body. The A/S told Djinnit that the CG discussed how to handle the UNSC arms embargo on Somalia. The UK had proposed a UNSC Presidential Statement partially lifting the embargo as soon as IGAD and the AU presented a detailed plan for a peace support mission. "Detailed," she added, was a relative term. Djinnit noted that the June 28 IGAD/AU meeting in Nairobi would likely appoint a mission to Somalia to assess needs of a peace support mission. All agreed that a positive UNSC statement prior to that meeting might be helpful.

HUDDLESTON